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“Careful what you wish . . . 
Careful what you say . . . 
Careful what you wish, you may regret it! 
Careful what you wish, you just might get it!” 
—Metallica, King Nothing (1996)1 
 
 †  Travis J. Denneson graduated from the University of Minnesota with a 
B.A. in philosophy in 1999, receiving Phi Kappa Phi honors.  He earned his J.D. 
from William Mitchell College of Law in June 2003. 
  A version of this article in an essay format won first prize in the 2003 
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at William Mitchell College of Law.  The 
author would like to thank Professor Niels Schaumann of William Mitchell College 
of Law for his many helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. 
 1. METALLICA, King Nothing, on LOAD (Elektra Records 1996).  After 
disgruntling many of their fans by playing a substantial role in the legal crusade to 
shut down Napster, Metallica found themselves embroiled in a public relations 
catastrophe.  The band has since taken more congenial measures to discourage 
illegal online file sharing and recover lost fan appreciation, including setting up a 
web site where fans can download live concert tracks of the band for free.  The 
“catch,” however, is that the web site can be accessed only by using a special code 
number obtained with the purchase their latest album, ST. ANGER (2003).  See Kirk 
Miller, Free Metallica: Metal Giants Give Away Tracks Online—But There’s a Catch, 
ROLLING STONE, July 10, 2003, at 16. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  Ownership of Speech 
Where artists and entertainers are concerned, it is difficult to 
imagine a set of legal protections more important than those 
provided by both copyright and the First Amendment.2  Without 
the exclusive rights granted by copyright laws, authors3 might have 
a difficult if not impossible time earning a living from their 
creations.4  Without the free speech guarantee of the First 
Amendment, the specter of state-sanctioned censorship could loom 
over authors endeavoring to challenge artistic or societal norms.  
The fear of poverty, punishment, or both might well be enough to 
keep most of our creative minds quietly confined to their day jobs. 
At first blush, the protections offered by copyright and the 
First Amendment seem perfectly complementary.  The Copyright 
Act5 works to provide a particular set of pecuniary incentives6 while 
 
 2. Other substantive areas of law often encountered by artists, entertainers, 
and their attorneys include contracts, trademark, labor, tax, business 
organizations, bankruptcy, family law, immigration, and criminal law.  See WILLIAM 
D. HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW CAREERS, 1-9 (2d ed. 1998). 
 3. The term “author” in this article does not refer simply to a writer of a 
book, but rather to a creator of a work rendered in any medium.  Generally, an 
author is “[o]ne who produces, by his own intellectual labor applied to the 
materials of his composition, an arrangement or compilation new in itself.  A 
beginner or mover of anything; hence efficient cause of a thing; creator; 
originator; a composer, as distinguished from an editor, translator, or compiler.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 133 (6th ed. 1990). See infra notes 71-74 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the different media in which works may 
enjoy copyright protection. 
 4. Some, however, would find this idea debatable.  At least one 
commentator has suggested that our current body of federal copyright and patent 
statutes might be unnecessary: 
[W]e should regard even extant copyright and patent protections 
skeptically.  Perhaps creators would do just as well without such legal 
fripperies.  We appear to suffer no shortage of creative perfumes, 
recipes, clothes designs, furniture, car bodies, or uninhabited 
architectural structures, even though U.S. law affords no effective 
protection to them qua original expressions or novel inventions.  
Perhaps the same would hold true of subject matter now covered by 
copyrights or patents were their protections removed. 
Tom W. Bell, INDELICATE IMBALANCING IN COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW, IN COPY 
FIGHTS: THE  FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 9 (Adam 
Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. eds., 2002) (internal citations omitted).  For 
purposes of this article, however, the efficacy of copyright’s incentive function in 
encouraging original works is assumed. 
 5. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1101 (2000). 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 69-78. 
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the First Amendment serves to remove the possibility of certain 
punitive disincentives.7  As such, both encourage the advancement 
of art and human discourse.  However, closer scrutiny reveals that 
there is an inherent tension between copyright interests and First 
Amendment values.  In order to protect an author’s work from 
financial exploitation by others, copyright must necessarily make 
that author’s speech off limits to all but the copyright holder.8  The 
First Amendment expressly states that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”9 but federal copyright 
laws make it illegal in many circumstances to use the expression of 
others in one’s own speech.10  On a fundamental level, therefore, 
copyright entails congressional action specifically designed to 
abridge freedom of speech.  The resulting quandary is that we are 
free to express ourselves however we wish,11 as long as we are 
careful not to make use of someone else’s copyrighted expression 
in the process.12 
If resolving this basic inconsistency were simply a matter of 
pitting a constitutional amendment against a congressional act, the 
First Amendment very likely would limit the scope of our current 
copyright regime.  However, copyright, like the First Amendment, 
is firmly anchored in the United States Constitution.  Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 expressly grants Congress the power “[t]o 
 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 49-57. 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 71-78 for a discussion of the exclusive 
rights and remedies copyright grants to authors. 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment also applies to state action 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 
(1966). 
 10. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). 
 11. With certain narrow exceptions.  See infra text accompanying note 34. 
 12. Theoretically speaking, two authors can independently create identical 
works without access to each other’s and both can be copyrighted.  To be 
copyrightable, a work need only be “original” in the sense that it originates from 
the author and possesses more than a de minimus amount of creativity.  There is no 
“novelty” requirement as in patent law.  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (explaining that, however unlikely, two poets 
can independently create identical poems and both are copyrightable because 
each poem originates solely from its respective author).  In practice, however, 
where proof of access to the work is absent, “striking similarity” will be sufficient to 
allow the infringement question to go to the jury.  See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 
F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987).  Moreover, copyright infringement requires no 
showing of intent, and can even be done subconsciously.  See ABKCO Music Inc. v. 
Harrisongs Music Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that George 
Harrison, in writing “My Sweet Lord,” subconsciously copied The Chiffons’s “He’s 
so Fine” and was thus liable for copyright infringement). 
3
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promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times 
to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings . . . .”13  
Often referred to as the “Copyright Clause,” this constitutional 
provision gives Congress the authority to enact a broad range of 
federal statutes designed to protect authors’ financial interests in 
their creations.14  The 1976 Copyright Act, which comprises our 
current body of federal copyright laws, is the product of this 
exercise of congressional power.15 
Because the First Amendment and copyright law are both 
securely rooted in the U.S. Constitution, courts have had to find a 
means of creating a proper equilibrium between them.  In the 
landmark case of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,16 
the Supreme Court set out the metes and bounds of copyright and 
First Amendment territory.  In doing so, the Court employed a 
seemingly elegant specimen of doctrinal parsing called the 
“definitional balance.”17  Specifically, the Court held that 
“copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy ‘strike[s] a definitional 
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by 
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an 
author’s expression.’ ”18  The Court also incorporated fair use into 
the equation, stating in sum that “First Amendment protections 
[are] already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and 
the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by 
fair use . . . .” 19  The Court also added historical support for its 
holding, noting that “it should not be forgotten that the Framers 
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.  By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy 
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way 
to advance public welfare . . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A (incorporating the fair use defense in the 1976 
Copyright Act). 
 16. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that the Nation magazine had no rights 
under either the First Amendment or fair use to lift quotations from President 
Ford’s as yet unpublished memoirs). 
 17. Id. at 556. 
 18. Id. (quoting the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
 19. Id. at 560. 
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disseminate ideas.”20  The conclusion to be drawn from the Harper 
& Row decision, therefore, is that copyright, by definition, 
adequately incorporates—and even facilitates—the objectives of 
the First Amendment. 
This proposition has spurred volumes of commentary, and a 
number of scholars have questioned whether the Court’s 
definitional balance scheme truly leaves adequate room for the full 
range of legitimate First Amendment concerns.21  With the 
ascension of the Internet and novel digital media formats, the 
tension between content owners’ rights and the public’s free 
speech rights has continued to escalate, and content owners have, 
as of late, been gaining an upper hand.22  Now, more than ever, this 
issue demands more careful scrutiny than the federal courts have 
traditionally afforded it.23 
Recently, the Supreme Court revisited the definitional balance 
doctrine in Eldred v. Ashcroft. 24  In this case, the Court was presented 
with an opportunity to provide a more rigorous analysis of the areas 
of tension between copyright and the First Amendment.  The 
 
 20. Id. at 558. 
 21. See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A 
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT, § 12 (1994); Stephen Fraser, The Conflict 
Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact on the Internet, 16 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright 
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 42 (2001); Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on 
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 709 (1992); Michael A. 
Einhorn, Miss Scarlett’s License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and Markets, 20 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 603 (2002); Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist’s Privilege, 15 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 252 (1997); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment 
Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept 
and Feel,” 38 EMORY L. J. 393, 411 (1989). 
 22. See infra note 79. 
 23. In essence, the courts have been applying 1970s thoughts to twenty-first 
century problems.  The definitional balance scheme is gleaned from early 
scholarly explorations of the issue during its infancy.  See Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-59 (1985) (citing such early 
works as Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 
(1982); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 78 (1971); Janice E. Oakes, Comment, Copyright 
and the First Amendment:Where Lies the Public Interest?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 135 (1984)).  
The ball appears to have started rolling with a well-known law review article written 
by Melville Nimmer in 1970 and another written by Paul Goldstein.  See Melville B. 
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First 
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970). 
 24. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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Court instead chose, in terse fashion, to punt the issue away.25  
Nevertheless, the Court did, in fact, make one important 
clarification—a holding that has become the primary impetus for 
this article. 
B.  The Eldred v. Ashcroft Decision 
The Eldred case traces its beginnings to 1998, when Congress 
passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).26  
This legislation added another twenty years to the duration of all 
copyright terms originally set out in the 1976 Copyright Act.27  The 
term extension applied not only to copyrighted works created 
subsequent to the CTEA’s effective date, but also to copyrighted 
works already in existence.28  The result was that the CTEA tacked 
an extra twenty years of bonus copyright protection onto works that 
were about to lapse into the public domain. 
Somewhat upset by this, a group of individuals and businesses 
with plans to utilize works whose copyrights were about to expire 
brought  suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, seeking a declaration that the CTEA was 
unconstitutional.29  One of the plaintiffs’ principal claims was that 
the CTEA violated the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee by 
robbing the public of the right to freely use speech that, but for the 
CTEA, would lapse into the public domain.30  However, the district 
 
 25. The Court’s treatment of the petitioners’ First Amendment claim takes 
up a mere page and a half in the Supreme Court reporter.  See 123 S.Ct. 769, 788-
90 (2003). 
 26. Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, §102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) 
(amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1976)). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000). 
 29. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).  The principal plaintiff, 
Eric Eldred, runs a Web site called the “Eldritch Press,” where he publishes the 
works of a number of classic literary authors.  Access to the works is free to the 
public.  See http://www.eldritchpress.org (last visited March 13, 2004). 
 30. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 75-81, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. 
Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 1:99CV00065 JLG), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/complaint_amd2.
html (last visited March 13, 2004).  The petitioners also challenged the CTEA 
under the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” provision.  See id. ¶¶ 56-67.  The 
Copyright Clause issue is an entirely different can of worms, and hence far outside 
the scope of this article.  For some interesting materials and discussion regarding 
the Eldred decision as a whole on the World Wide Web, see generally 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/ (last visited March 13, 
2004). 
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court rejected this claim, holding simply that “there are no First 
Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others.”31  In a 
subsequent appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals similarly disposed of the plaintiffs’ free speech claim, 
declaring Harper & Row to be an “insuperable bar[] to plaintiffs’ 
First Amendment theory”32 and holding that “copyrights are 
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”33  After 
encountering defeats at both the trial and appellate levels, the 
plaintiffs petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari to hear the case.34 
The Supreme Court, however, gave the petitioners no quarter.  
Downplaying the petitioners’ First Amendment challenge to the 
CTEA,35 the Court held that it would not impose “uncommonly 
strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own 
speech-protective purposes and safeguards.”36  By way of support, 
the Court simply reasserted the definitional balance doctrine upon 
which it had previously relied in Harper & Row.  First, the Court 
explained, copyright law protects only expression, and not ideas.37  
Therefore, it does not place any strain on the First Amendment’s 
overarching purpose, which is to ensure the free dissemination of 
ideas.38  Moreover, the Court reemphasized, copyright law is 
“intended . . . to be the engine of free expression,” in that it 
provides an incentive for people to create more original works, 
which in turn fosters the spread of ideas.39  Second, the fair use 
doctrine permits the copying of another’s expression in certain 
 
 31. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3. 
 32. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d. 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 33. Id. (emphasis added).  The D.C. Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), as 
well as its own decision in United Video, Inc. v. F.C.C., 890 F.2d 1173 (1989). Id. 
 34. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (order granting writ of 
certiorari). 
 35. By this time, the plaintiffs had significantly honed their First Amendment 
argument, alleging more specifically that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation 
of speech that does not satisfy intermediate scrutiny review because it re-allocates 
the right to use certain speech from a waiting public back to a privileged few 
without any relation to copyright’s incentive to create.  See Brief for Petitioners at 
39, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618). 
 36. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 37. Id.  A thorough discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy appears 
infra Part III. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (“Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to promote the creation and 
publication of free expression.”). 
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circumstances, such as education, criticism, and even parody. 40  
Hence, as Justice Ginsberg put it, the Copyright Act “contains built-
in First Amendment accommodations.”41 
Although the Supreme Court’s holding in Eldred seems to have 
solidified its adoption of the definitional balance approach to 
copyright and First Amendment tensions, the Court did overrule 
the D.C. Circuit on one crucial issue.  Apparently thinking it 
imprudent to declare a blanket bar on all future First Amendment 
claims against copyright, the Court held that “the D.C. Circuit 
spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically 
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.’ ”42  The 
ramifications of this holding are significant: It leaves the door ajar, 
albeit only slightly, for courts to consider First Amendment values 
in copyright cases where free speech principles might outweigh 
content owners’ financial concerns. 
Under what circumstances should courts give added 
consideration to First Amendment concerns?  After Eldred, it would 
seem that the vast majority of First Amendment challenges to 
copyright will be rebuffed by courts under the definitional balance 
doctrine.  The territory covered by the Eldred decision, however, 
should extend only to the points at which the definitional balance 
begins to break down and First Amendment interests remain vital.  
Therefore, it is crucial to analyze the true complexities involved in 
balancing free speech concerns with the creative incentive function 
of the copyright system in order to identify the ways in which the 
definitional balance falls short of providing an adequate 
accommodation for First Amendment liberties.  The purpose of 
this article is to provide such an analysis in order to reveal the 
narrow circumstances under which courts, in light of Eldred, might 
yet allow First Amendment values to overcome the economic 
interests of copyright holders.43 
 
 40. Id. at 220. 
 41. Id. at 219. 
 42. Id. at 221 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
 43. This article will focus mainly on bolstering the consideration of First 
Amendment values in the arena of copyright infringement cases.  Although the 
Eldred decision involved a First Amendment attack on a congressionally enacted 
copyright law, its holding applies equally to the use of the First Amendment as a 
defense to copyright infringement.  In the Court’s own words: 
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ attempt to distinguish Harper & 
Row on the ground that it involved an infringement suit rather than a 
declaratory action of the kind here presented. As respondent observes, 
the same legal question can arise in either posture.  In both postures, it is 
8
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Part II of this article explains the foundations of both 
copyright law and the First Amendment, and provides a brief 
discussion of the increasing tensions between copyright interests 
and First Amendment liberties in modern society.44  Part III first 
expounds the legal and conceptual framework underlying the 
idea/expression dichotomy in copyright and then offers arguments 
to show where it fails to account for overarching First Amendment 
concerns.45  Part IV begins by delving into an explication of the fair 
use defense, followed by a discussion elucidating reasons why the 
defense currently lacks the teeth necessary to protect certain 
legitimate free speech rights from being subsumed by copyright.46  
Part V concludes that the objectives of both the First Amendment 
and copyright would be better served by allowing greater flexibility 
with regard to invoking the First Amendment where the 
definitional balance falls short in accommodating important First 
Amendment values.47 
II. A “DEFINITIONAL BALANCE” 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”48  With certain narrow 
exceptions, the First Amendment ensures that the content of an 
individual’s speech will not lead to criminal prosecution or civil 
liability.49  That is, the ideas one expresses, as well as the manner in 
 
appropriate to construe copyright’s internal safeguards to accommodate First 
Amendment concerns. 
Id. at 221 n.24 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Therefore, the 
Court’s holding that copyrights are not “categorically immune” from First 
Amendment challenges applies in copyright infringement cases as well as 
declaratory judgments. 
 44. See infra Part II. 
 45. See infra Part III. 
 46. See infra Part IV. 
 47. See infra Part V. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 49. First Amendment protection from content-based government regulation 
generally does not extend to the sale of obscenity, “fighting words,” libel and 
defamation, deceitful advertising, or speech inciting imminent lawless or violent 
behavior.  See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (maintaining that 
obscene speech falls outside of First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding, somewhat opaquely, that speech can be 
prohibited if a person of common intelligence would deem such words likely to 
cause an average person to fight); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding that states may prohibit 
9
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which those ideas are expressed, are subject to a broad scope of 
protection from government interference.  The First Amendment 
shields many controversial forms of speech, including sexually 
“indecent” speech,50 hate speech,51 criticism of public figures and 
officials,52 public use of “offensive” words,53 and even symbolic 
speech, such as the burning of the U.S. flag.54  Although First 
Amendment freedoms have never been held absolute,55 those who 
choose to advance minority viewpoints and engage in controversial 
modes of expression are usually spared from governmentally 
imposed censorship.56 
There is no better evidence of the high premium that our 
jurisprudence places on freedom of expression than the regime of 
heightened scrutiny our judiciary applies to government 
regulations of speech.  Any state regulation of speech based on 
content or viewpoint is subject to strict scrutiny review, requiring 
 
commercial speech that is either misleading or concerns illegal activity); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that public figures and 
officials may recover for defamatory falsehood if they can prove actual malice on 
the part of the speaker); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that 
advocacy of illegal behavior cannot be prohibited except where it is directed 
toward inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action). 
 50. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (holding 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 unconstitutional because it impinges on the 
First Amendment rights of adults to access explicit speech on the Internet). 
 51. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (1992) (holding City of 
St. Paul’s hate crime ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment 
because it unjustifiably regulates speech based on content and viewpoint). 
 52. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding 
that First Amendment values require public figures and officials to carry the 
burden of proving actual malice on the part of the speaker in defamation suits).  
See also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding that public 
figures and officials cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
without a showing of New York Times malice). 
 53. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the First 
Amendment prevented plaintiff Cohen from being prosecuted for publicly 
donning a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft”). 
 54. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (holding Texas’ anti-flag 
burning statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment).  See also United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1990) (holding Federal Flag Protection 
Act of 1989 likewise unconstitutional). 
 55. See supra notes 49-53. 
 56. However, community censorship of controversial speech is often achieved 
in ways other than outright government regulation through legislative action.  See 
generally MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S 
CENSORSHIP WARS (1993) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the myriad 
ways in which unpopular speech can be suppressed). 
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that the regulation in question be narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling government interest.57  In order to satisfy the narrow 
tailoring requirement, the government’s regulation must provide 
the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s interest.58  
Strict scrutiny imposes a strong presumption of the government 
regulation’s invalidity and almost invariably dooms the regulation.59  
Content-neutral regulations of speech60 are subject to a somewhat 
lower yet still rigid standard of review, called intermediate 
scrutiny.61  To be deemed content-neutral, a government regulation 
must be “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” and only 
have an “incidental effect” on speech.62  Intermediate scrutiny 
requires that the government regulation be narrowly tailored to 
serve a substantial government interest.63  Narrow tailoring for the 
purposes of intermediate scrutiny requires that the regulation does 
not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further 
the government’s legitimate interests.”64  In addition to being 
subject to one or another form of heightened scrutiny, government 
 
 57. Sable Communications of Cal. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Content-neutral regulations of speech usually involve some kind of 
restriction on the time, place, or manner in which the speech may be made.  The 
government’s regulation must also leave open adequate alternative channels for 
communication.  See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) 
(holding that city may impose volume limit on outdoor public rock concert); City 
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 63 (1986) (upholding zoning 
ordinance prohibiting adult theaters from being within 1000 feet of any 
residential zone, park, school, or church because it is purportedly aimed at 
combating “secondary effects” such as crime and the reduction in value of 
surrounding property). 
 61. Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 442 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 62. Id. at 450. 
 63. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).  Intermediate 
scrutiny does not always entail the same standard of review in each case.  The level 
of scrutiny can range from just short of strict to something a notch above a 
rational basis test.  Depending on the nature of the constitutional right involved, 
courts have used terms such as substantial, important, and significant in setting the 
level of government interest and the degree to which the regulation in question is 
tailored to achieving that interest.  For example, under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state-imposed classifications based on 
gender must be substantially related to an important government purpose, and 
the government has the burden of showing an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” for such classifications.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
531 (1996). 
 64. Corley, 273 F.3d at 450 (citing Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting 
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799)). 
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regulations of speech also can be struck down for being overbroad65 
or too vague.66 
Copyright law, on the other hand, has its own constitutional 
underpinnings.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times 
to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”67  The 
function of copyright is to provide an economic incentive for 
individuals to create original works, with the ultimate goal of 
benefiting the public.68  The Supreme Court’s view is that “the 
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free 
expression.  By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s 
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create 
and disseminate ideas.”69  As a means of giving practical effect to 
this incentive, the Copyright Act allows authors to legally prevent 
others from copying “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”70  These include literary, musical, 
dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, audiovisual, 
and architectural works, as well as sound recordings.71  It grants 
copyright holders the exclusive rights to the reproduction, 
adaptation, distribution, public performance, and public display of 
copyrighted works.72  Furthermore, because of the CTEA, the term 
of copyright in works created by individual persons now lasts the 
life of the author plus an additional seventy years.73  Copyright 
holders have the right to sue others for using the expression 
contained in their original works.  Liability can result in 
injunctions,74 orders to pay damages,75 and, in some instances, 
 
 65. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (holding 
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment because it prohibits more protected speech than necessary to achieve 
its ends). 
 66. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (finding 
provisions of the Communications Decency Act impermissibly vague). 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 68. See supra note 14. 
 69. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 70. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 71. Id. § 102(a)(1-8). 
 72. Id. § 106. 
 73. Id. § 302.  In the case of anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and 
works made for hire, “copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its 
first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever 
expires first.”  Id. § 302(c). 
 74. Id. § 502. 
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orders to pay attorneys’ fees.76  Moreover, violators may be subject 
to federal criminal sanctions, which can involve steep fines, prison 
terms, or both.77 
It is clear that the Copyright Act is a federal statutory scheme 
that regulates speech.  It imposes criminal and civil penalties on 
authors who use the copyrightable expression of others in violation 
of the Act.78  Although authors rely on the copyright system to 
make a living from their work, the copyright system can also be 
used against them.  Big-business interests such as Hollywood, the 
recording industry, and software developers have wielded their 
financial power in Congress79 and in courts to provide themselves 
with a strong upper hand in the evolution of our federal copyright 
law.80  The result is that a large swath of today’s popular culture is 
subject to some claim of copyright ownership.  The mass media, 
 
 75. Id. § 504. 
 76. Id. § 505. 
 77. Id. § 506. 
 78. For example, Jeff Koons, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 156 
and 169-72, is a postmodern artist who has been successfully sued in copyright 
infringement actions for his Warhol-esque appropriation of copyrighted pop 
culture figures.  In each case, his work was forfeited, and he was ordered to pay 
hefty damages. 
 79. Big-business content owners are heavily involved in lobbying Congress, 
where advancing technologies have prompted calls for tougher legislation.  Jack 
Valenti, the well-known and highly influential spokesperson for the Motion 
Picture Association of America, has been a rabid lobbyist on Capitol Hill for 
tighter statutory protection for copyrights in film.  See, e.g., Copyrights: Government, 
Industry Leaders Hail Copyrights as “Jewel” in U.S. Trade Crown, BNA PATENT, 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY NEWS, Dec. 17, 1999, Westlaw, BNA-PTD, 
12/17/1999 PTD d2 (quoting Valenti’s claim that intellectual property protection 
has to be the “highest priority of Congress”).  The Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, which many say goes too far in protecting digital copyright management 
systems, is a result of lobbying efforts by Valenti and others.  See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1201-1205 (West 2002). 
 80. Examples of recent power grabs achieved by big-business content owners 
are: A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’g in part 
and rev’g in part, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that Napster online 
file-sharing service contributorily infringed copyrights in sound recordings); 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corely, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding an 
injunction under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act barring the defendant 
from posting the code of a DVD decryption program called “DeCSS” on his web 
site); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 681 (D.D.C. 2003) (enforcing subpoena granted under Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act requiring Internet service provider, Verizon, to disclose identities of 
individuals using its service for suspected illegal online music file trading).  For a 
discussion of peer-to-peer technology and the ramifications of the Napster decision, 
see Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1001 (2002). 
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mostly owned by large corporate interests, dominate our culture 
through sounds, images, and expressions that are plastered 
throughout television, radio, newspapers, magazines, billboards, 
and the Internet.  Because so many of these elements of culture are 
increasingly subject to copyright protection, authors—especially 
those who wish to make artistic or political statements about 
society—are left with fewer and fewer raw materials with which to 
work.81  These limitations can create serious fundamental problems 
for freedom of speech. 
Copyright infringement litigation, therefore, has become a 
powerful weapon for stifling the speech of business competitors, 
critics, and artists whose works comment on popular culture.82  This 
threat of expensive and time-consuming litigation, not to mention 
the consequences of losing such a lawsuit, can have a profound 
chilling effect on expression—especially for the all-too-common 
“starving artist” with limited financial resources. 
The ramifications of such expansionist trends in the 
protection of intellectual property strongly point toward a need to 
scrutinize more closely what the Supreme Court calls the 
“definitional balance” between First Amendment rights and the 
goals of the copyright protection.83  Any attempt to find the proper 
equilibrium between protecting an author’s right to freedom of 
expression on the one hand and ensuring an author’s ability to 
make a living from her work on the other requires examining 
whether the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine 
 
 81. See Schaumann, An Artist’s Privilege, supra note 21, at 249.  Professor 
Schaumann discusses the ownership of popular culture by corporate mass media 
outlets and the negative impact this has had on certain post-modern artists, most 
notably Jeff Koons.  Id. at 251.  Schaumann goes on to propose that an “Artist’s 
Privilege” exception should be made available to accommodate creators of fine art 
whose genre entails the appropriation of various copyrighted images. Id. at 256. 
 82. For a discussion of the Koons cases see infra notes 156 and 169-72 and 
accompanying text.  In regard to business competitors in particular, the software 
industry has been a copyright litigation battleground.  See, e.g., Computer Assocs. 
Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Mfrs. Techs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 
F.Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 
F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).  In cases such as these, courts have struggled with issues 
concerning the protectable elements of programming code.  In another area of 
concern, The Church of Scientology has successfully used copyright law to shield 
church doctrine from outside criticism.  See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online 
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 83. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
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together adequately accommodate the totality of First Amendment 
rights. 
III. THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY 
A.  Copyright Protection Does Not Extend to Ideas 
An integral component of the “definitional balance” lies in 
what is called the idea/expression dichotomy.  This dichotomy is 
based on the fact that copyright protection does not extend to 
ideas.  A person may create a work that uses someone else’s ideas, 
as long as the expression used to advance those ideas is not taken.  
The Supreme Court case commonly cited for this well-settled 
principle is Baker v. Selden.84  In this decision, the Court held that 
Selden’s description of his system of accounting in a book did not 
render the system in question subject to copyright protection.85  
The fact that Selden explained his accounting methods in a 
published literary work, accompanied by illustrations, did not alter 
the fact that his methods were ideas.86  If Baker had copied 
verbatim, or even closely paraphrased, Selden’s explanation of his 
accounting system, i.e., Selden’s expression, then Baker would have 
been liable for copyright infringement.87  However, Baker used only 
the methods described in Selden’s book—not the expression 
Selden used in order to describe those methods.88  As the Court 
properly concluded, Baker had every legal right to make use of 
Selden’s ideas.89 
Congress incorporated this all-important principle into section 
102 of the 1976 Copyright Act.90  Section 102(a) states that 
“[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” and section 102(b) 
makes it clear that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
 
 84. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).  However, the Court described this distinction in 
terms of “use” versus “explanation,” as opposed to “idea” versus “expression.” Id. at 
105. 
 85. Id. at 107. 
 86. Id. at 103. 
 87. Id. at 104. 
 88. Id. at 101. 
 89. Id. at 107. 
 90. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
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illustrated, or embodied in such work.”91 
Ideas are the province of the patent system, which has its own 
set of rules and standards for determining whether something—
such as a particular functional design, method of operation, or 
process—is worthy of protection.92  Copyright law, on the other 
hand, protects only the particular expression that an author uses to 
convey an idea.93  For example, the order and choice of words in 
this essay are subject to copyright protection, but the legal 
arguments and factual statements advanced herein are not.  The 
arguments and facts are ideas, and anyone may use them without 
engaging in copyright infringement.94  To use another example, 
the particular selection and arrangement of shapes, colors, and 
other images in a painting are protected because these things 
represent the painter’s own individual expression.95  Whatever 
“message” or “meaning” may be contained in the painting, 
however, is an unprotectable idea.96  These examples illustrate how 
the idea/expression dichotomy is viewed as a crucial component of 
the definitional balance between copyright law and the First 
Amendment. 
Clearly, an important purpose of the First Amendment is to 
further the spread of ideas and information.  This is sometimes 
referred to as the “enlightenment function.”97  If ideas were subject 
 
 91. Id. § 102(b). 
 92. See generally Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105 (2003) (explaining 
conditions of patentability for “any new and useful process, machine,” etc.). 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 94. Here it is appropriate to differentiate between copyright infringement 
and plagiarism.  Plagiarism is essentially the intentional taking of another’s 
expression and/or ideas without giving due credit to the actual source and 
subsequently holding such ideas out as one’s own.  Thus, copyright and plagiarism 
are fundamentally different in two respects: (1) it is possible to plagiarize 
another’s work without using the original author’s particular expression and (2) 
copyright infringement does not require that the unauthorized taking of the 
original author’s expression be done intentionally.  In that sense, copyright 
infringement is based in strict liability.  However, willful copyright infringement 
and plagiarism go hand in hand, and can subject the infringer to harsher civil 
penalties.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000) (allowing increased damages for willful 
infringement).  The basic difference is that plagiarism is merely unethical (it 
could subject one to academic discipline as a student or tarnish one’s reputation 
as a professional), while copyright infringement is illegal. 
 95. See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat’l Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62 
(3d Cir. 1978). 
 96. See id. at 65 (“Since copyrights do not protect thematic concepts, the fact 
that the same subject matter may be present in two paintings does not prove 
copying or infringement.”). 
 97. See SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 12.05[2]. 
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to copyright protection, the “marketplace of ideas” would likely 
become barren.98  Authors would be unable to publish works that 
build upon the ideas of others.  They would either have to obtain 
some kind of licensing agreement or risk being sued, both of which 
would seriously squelch the advancement of knowledge and 
understanding. 
To their credit, the federal courts have been fairly vigilant in 
ensuring that ideas remain freely usable and have gone beyond the 
principles espoused in Baker v. Selden in order to spare them from 
copyright protection.  One example is the “merger doctrine,” 
which provides that if there is only a very limited number of ways to 
express an idea, then the idea and expression are said to have 
“merged.”99  The merger doctrine is a judicially created principle 
designed to prevent people from securing copyright ownership in 
an idea.100  It is not generally treated as an affirmative defense like 
fair use, but rather it is used as an argument for denying that the 
expression the defendant took from the plaintiff was copyrightable 
subject matter.101  Another example lies in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,102 
which provides that a work must “possess more than a de minimis 
quantum of creativity” in order to satisfy the originality 
requirement for copyrightable subject matter.103  Hence, not only 
are facts and ideas uncopyrightable, but any selection, 
arrangement, and coordination of facts or ideas that is “so 
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever” is 
likewise precluded from copyright protection.104  The Supreme 
Court has indeed gone to some length to create a strong buffer 
zone of uncopyrightability around ideas and facts.  Nevertheless, 
deeper analysis reveals that the idea/expression dichotomy does 
not make as well-positioned a fulcrum for definitional balancing as 
 
 98. The “marketplace of ideas” concept originated in Justice Holmes’ dissent 
in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), in which he wrote of the 
importance of “free trade in ideas” and “the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.” 
 99. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 
1967). 
 100. See id. 
 101. However, some courts, for reasons of practicality, treat the merger 
doctrine as an affirmative defense.  See, e.g., NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1989 WL 
67434 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989). 
 102. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 103. Id. at 363. 
 104. Id. at 362. 
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one might suppose. 
B.  Difficulties Inherent in the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
A major problem with the idea/expression dichotomy is that 
ideas are not always easily distinguishable from the expression used 
to convey them.  For this reason, the use of the term “dichotomy” 
to describe the relationship between idea and expression is 
essentially a misnomer.105  Many ideas are impossible to convey 
without copying the particular expression used to convey them.  
For example, a photograph of the My Lai massacre, as Melville 
Nimmer and Rodney Smolla point out, is a work that contains an 
idea that cannot realistically be conveyed without copying the 
photograph itself and consequently copying the photographer’s 
expression.106  The dissemination of the photograph, unchecked by 
copyright law, serves the First Amendment’s “enlightenment 
function” in a way that a verbal or written description cannot: 
In the case of My Lai, a denial that in fact any deaths had 
occurred would have been devastatingly refuted by the 
photographs in a way that the verbal reports of the deaths 
simply could not do.  Anyone who would have to pass on 
their “ideas,” i.e., the fact that dead bodies were seen 
sprawled on the ground, would be at least as suspect as 
those who originally reported the occurrence of the 
deaths.  The photographs themselves—the “expression of 
the idea,”—made all the difference.107 
Here, Nimmer and Smolla illuminate how written reports of 
an incident such as this—one so unbelievably terrible—simply fail 
to get the message across like a photograph can. 
Another example is the famous Zapruder film of the Kennedy 
assassination.  In Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, the defendant 
published a book describing his theories regarding the Kennedy 
assassination.108  The book contained sketches copied from the key 
frames of Zapruder’s film, which Life magazine had previously 
purchased the exclusive rights to use.109  Life sued for copyright 
 
 105. A “dichotomy” is defined as the “division of a class into two opposed 
subclasses, as real and unreal.”  WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 
505 (2d ed. 1983). 
 106. SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 12.05[2][c][ii]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. 293 F. Supp. 130, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 109. Id. at 132. 
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infringement, and the defendant raised both the First Amendment 
and fair use as defenses.110  The court, per Judge Wyatt, avoided the 
First Amendment issue and held that the defendant’s copying was a 
fair use because the “public interest in having the fullest 
information available on the murder of President Kennedy” 
outweighed the copyright interest held by Life magazine.111  
Although the court characterized the defendant’s rights in terms of 
fair use and not freedom of speech, the case represents a rare 
application of the fair use doctrine and constitutes judicial 
recognition of the fact that the images from the film convey ideas 
that cannot be extracted from the means used to express them.112 
This raises a serious question concerning the Supreme Court’s 
reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy.  In Harper & Row, the 
Court articulated and justified the idea/expression dichotomy in 
the context of a literary work, reasoning that copying is not 
necessary when authors can put the expression of others in their 
own words.113  However, it is much easier to formulate alternative 
words and phrases to express another’s written idea than it is to 
find different ways to convey an idea expressed in a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work.  For example, to convey the idea of the 
sheer horror of the Holocaust, an article could be written by an 
eyewitness at Auschwitz describing the conditions of the camp.  In 
turn, someone else who had never been to Auschwitz could use the 
facts and ideas from that article in writing a book about the 
Holocaust, as long as that author did not use the original 
eyewitness’s expression.  Leaving aside for now the varying degrees 
of impact certain words might have on the reader, the same general 
idea would come across in both the original article and the book.  
But if photographs capturing images of the conditions at Auschwitz 
were taken by an eyewitness, the ideas conveyed by the 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 146. 
 112. Judge Wyatt’s decision has been the subject of ongoing controversy.  
Critics, including Melville Nimmer, have criticized Wyatt’s application of fair use 
in lieu of a First Amendment defense for a variety reasons, one being his express 
failure to consider Life magazine’s potential market for derivative works, and 
another being that the overall “public interest” is not technically a factor in 
determining fair use.  Arguably, the implication is that Judge Wyatt held in favor 
of the defendants under the First Amendment sub silentio, but clothed his 
arguments in fair use terms.  For a discussion of the fair use and First Amendment 
implications of the Zapruder film case, see Fraser, supra note 21, at 21-31. 
 113. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 
(1985). 
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photographs would likely provide a much deeper and more 
convincing sense of the inhumanity and cruelty that transpired 
there. 
The ideas conveyed by such photographs, which are 
qualitatively different than a written account, simply could not be 
relayed to others without displaying or distributing copies of the 
photographs themselves.  As Nimmer and Smolla further elaborate: 
[The] definitional balance breaks down in those special 
instances where the expression for a given idea may not 
be independently supplied by an idea copier.  One who 
wished to convey fully the “idea” of the My Lai massacre 
photographs could do so only by copying the expression 
as well as the idea of the photographs.  To attempt a 
simulated photograph with models posing as dead bodies 
in order to express the idea of the original My Lai 
photographs would be ludicrous.  The expression must be 
copied along with the idea not because it is onerous for an 
idea copier to create his own expression, but rather 
because the idea cannot be conveyed unless the 
expression is also copied.114 
What we should take from Nimmer and Smolla’s My Lai 
illustration is the understanding that explaining the distinction 
between idea and expression is a much tidier job when done in the 
context of literary works.  The written word lends itself more easily 
to alternative ways of conveying a particular idea.  However, once 
we attempt to separate idea and expression in the contexts of other 
media, whatever clarity the distinction might have had all but 
disappears. 
Nimmer specifically suggests that there should be a “news 
photograph” First Amendment exception for use of copyrighted 
images in order to protect the public interest in obtaining 
information, and that such an exception would shore up any 
remaining imbalance between the First Amendment and 
copyright.115  Nimmer’s suggestion, although laudable in its own 
right, is shortsighted.  Nimmer’s proposed solution does not go far 
enough to accommodate the overall universe of free speech 
concerns, and is symptomatic of a rather vexing tendency among 
scholars and the courts to conflate the objectives served by the 
Speech Clause and the Press Clause whenever copyrights are at 
 
 114. SMOLLA, supra note 21, § 12.05[2][d] (citation omitted). 
 115. Id. § 1205[3]. 
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stake.116  This confusion is partly to blame for the fact that so much 
emphasis is placed on the so-called “enlightenment function” of 
the First Amendment, upon which the viability of the 
idea/expression dichotomy seems to rest. 
Although some overlap certainly exists, the Speech and Press 
clauses of the First Amendment serve two otherwise distinct 
functions.117  The purpose of the Press Clause is to ensure 
journalistic freedom from government interference.118  A free press 
will serve as a “watchdog” by keeping the public informed as to the 
actions of their government and the events in their community.119  
The Framers strongly regarded an informed electorate to be an 
indispensable element of a successfully functioning democratic 
society.120  In their eyes, a guaranteed free press under the First 
Amendment would ensure the unbridled gathering and 
dissemination of ideas, knowledge, and information.121 
The Speech Clause, on the other hand, is designed with the 
personal, expressive freedom of an individual in mind.122  As 
Professor C. Edwin Baker explains: 
[T]he First Amendment should distinguish the Speech 
and Press Clauses. Freedom of speech protects a broad 
realm of individual expressive liberty. Speech freedom is 
an embodiment of one of the most fundamental human 
values, the right of an individual to make her own choices 
 
 116. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
891, 897 (2002). 
 117. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).  “It was not by accident or 
coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a 
single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition 
for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 118. See Baker, supra note 116, at 919. 
 119. Id. at 951 n.140 (citing C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 
125-213 (2002)).  See also David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 
UCLA L. Rev. 455, 491-92 (1983). 
 120. Leslie Yalof Garfield, Note, Curtailment of Early Election Predictions: Can We 
Predict the Outcome?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 489, 520 (1984).  Garfield notes that the 
theory of “first amendment protection of free speech [as being] essential to an 
intelligent self-government in a democratic society was strongly advocated by 
Alexander Meiklejohn.” Id. at 495 n.28  Garfield goes on to note that “Meiklejohn 
asserted that the objective of the framers was to help American citizens 
understand their own political institutions.” Id. (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948)). 
 121. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530 (noting that rights to freedom in speech and 
press were coupled with the right to assemble). 
 122. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. 
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about the values she expresses. This notion of speech 
freedom emphasizes the normative requirement that the 
state respect a person’s autonomy and not make 
paternalistic decisions about what she can express.  This is 
the free speech right that Justice Brennan has described 
as “inviolate;” the free speech right that an earlier Court 
explained protected the child who refuses to salute the 
flag.  That is, the Constitution requires respect for 
individual autonomy and mandates protection of 
individual speech choices.123 
The dissemination of ideas and facts, i.e., the “enlightenment 
function” to which Nimmer and the Supreme Court often allude, is 
more closely aligned with the objectives of the Press Clause than 
with the Speech Clause.  As Professor Baker correctly argues, the 
First Amendment places “protection of individual liberty at the 
heart of the Speech Clause and protection of democratic 
communications structures at the heart of the Press Clause.”124  
Therefore, even if the Supreme Court were to adopt Nimmer’s 
“news photograph” exception or even Judge Wyatt’s fair use stance 
on Life’s monopoly over the Zapruder films,125 it would only serve to 
alleviate a First Amendment shortcoming of the copyright system 
with respect to the Press Clause. 
Put simply, the First Amendment does not protect ideas alone.  
It also protects the way in which an individual chooses to express 
those ideas.  The Supreme Court has struck down numerous state 
and federal attempts to suppress controversial and unpopular 
forms of expression, notwithstanding the fact that there may be less 
incendiary, disruptive, intrusive, or offensive ways of conveying the 
particular idea expressed—even certain forms of conduct that 
qualify as “symbolic speech,” such as burning the American flag.126  
As the Court so eloquently stated in Cohen v. California,127 “we 
cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular 
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in 
the process.”128  Nevertheless, this crucial First Amendment 
 
 123. Baker, supra note 116, at 897-98 (citations omitted). 
 124. Id. at 951. 
 125. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra note 54. 
 127. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).  Another fact that many in copyright and First 
Amendment circles find interesting about this case is that it was none other than 
Melville Nimmer himself who represented and ultimately exonerated Mr. Cohen. 
 128. Id. at 26.  Justice Brennan made a similarly lucid observation in his 
famous dissent in F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (ruling that the 
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principle becomes lost on the Court whenever freedom of speech is 
invoked as a defense to a claim of copyright infringement. 
It has been shown that there is a certain precariousness 
involved in trying to surgically extract pure ideas from the 
expression in which those ideas are embedded.  The 
idea/expression dichotomy, therefore, does not provide a 
sufficiently careful balancing of First Amendment liberties with the 
objectives of copyright protection.  Even so, the textbook response 
to any set of arguments exposing the free speech protective 
inadequacy of the idea/expression dichotomy involves an appeal to 
the fair use doctrine.  As will be shown, however, the fair use 
defense, as it is currently applied, makes for a woefully inadequate 
free speech “accommodation.” 
IV. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE 
A.  Fair Use Explained 
Long before the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, courts 
had developed a common law safety valve for defendants accused 
of copyright infringement.129  A defendant was entitled to argue 
that the copying of the plaintiff’s work was a fair use.130  Justice 
Story’s oft-quoted formulation of the doctrine asked courts to “look 
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and 
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may 
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, 
of the original work” in determining whether the defendant’s use 
 
Federal Communications Commission may prohibit indecent speech on the radio 
during daytime hours when children are likely to be inadvertently exposed): 
The idea that the content of a message and its potential impact on any 
who might receive it can be divorced from the words that are the 
vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious.  A given work may 
have a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or 
conjure up an image.  Indeed, for those of us who place an 
appropriately high value on our cherished First Amendment rights, the 
word “censor” is such a word. 
Id. at 773 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
 129. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 346-47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) 
(holding that letters written by George Washington were exclusively copyrighted 
and defendants were enjoined from further publishing the letters in their book).  
The 1976 Copyright Act’s predecessor, the 1909 Copyright Act, contained no 
provision for fair use.  See generally 1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 
1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000)). 
 130. Folsom, 9 F.Cas. at 348. 
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of the plaintiff’s expression was fair and thus prevented the plaintiff 
from recovering.131 
While drafting the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress wrote fair use 
into section 107, which provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, 
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright.  In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon 
consideration of all the above factors.132 
Fair use has been held to be an affirmative defense,133 which 
requires a court to first find that the defendant’s use infringes the 
plaintiff’s work.  Only after the infringement issue is fully litigated 
or the defendant concedes infringement can the fair use issue be 
examined.134  A fair use analysis requires a court to apply the factors 
listed in section 107 on a case-by-case basis, according to the nature 
of the defendant’s use.135  Some factors will be more applicable 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 133. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 
(1985). 
 134. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) (“It is 
uncontested here that 2 Live Crew’s song would be an infringement of Acuff-
Rose’s rights in ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ under the Copyright Act of 1976, but for a 
finding of fair use through parody.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 135. Id. at 577 (citing to Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560). 
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than others depending on the facts of each particular case.136  In 
addition, the list of factors in section 107 is nonexclusive, which 
gives courts some latitude in arriving at a finding of fair use based 
on other considerations.137 
In practice, the first and fourth factors, namely “the purpose 
and character of the use” and “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” are usually 
given the most weight.138  In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,139  the 
Supreme Court held “transformative” uses to be strong candidates 
for fair use protection.140  A transformative use “adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with [a] new expression, meaning, or message,” as opposed to a 
work that merely “supplants” the original in the marketplace.141  A 
parody of another’s work, for instance, is now a well-recognized 
transformative use because “it can provide social benefit, by 
shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a 
new one.”142  The fourth factor is also given greater weight because 
if there is little or no impact on the plaintiff’s current or potential 
market, then no damage is done to the financial incentive function 
of the copyright monopoly.143  The first and fourth factors usually 
go hand-in-hand because the more transformative a use is, the less 
likely it will substitute for the original in the marketplace, and the 
less relevant the second and third factors are to the analysis.144 
The fair use defense is viewed as a prophylactic against the 
draconian enforcement of the exclusive rights provided to 
copyright holders under sections 106 and 106A.145  It absolves 
defendants of liability for infringement by permitting certain uses 
 
 136. See id. at 577-78 (emphasizing the “illustrative” nature of the text and that 
the factors must be analyzed “in light of the purposes of copyright”). 
 137. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-61. 
 138. See id. at 566 (describing the last factor, the effect on the market, as being 
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”).  See also Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 578-86 (analyzing the first factor of section 107 and placing 
considerable emphasis on whether the work is transformative). 
 139. 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (ruling 2 Live Crew’s rap parody of Roy Orbison’s 
“Pretty Woman” to be fair use). 
 140. Id. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding 
of fair use.”). 
 141. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 462). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 590-94 (analyzing the fourth factor of section 107). 
 144. Id. at 581 (contrasting parodies based on the risk of market substitution). 
 145. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2000). 
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that are consistent with the ultimate end of the copyright system, 
which is to benefit the public.146  Fair use requires courts “to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it 
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to 
foster.”147  In other words, it attempts to prevent copyright from 
becoming self-defeating.  Although the Supreme Court has never 
expressly ruled fair use a constitutional requirement,148 it has long 
recognized that certain latitude must be allowed for scholarship, 
comment, and criticism in order to prevent the copyright system 
from stunting the advancement of human thought.149  The Court 
also maintains that because the fair use exception carves out a 
significant swath of permissible copying for these purposes, First 
Amendment freedoms are adequately accommodated as well.150 
B.  The Shortcomings of the Fair Use Defense 
Reliance upon the fair use doctrine, as it is currently applied, 
to shore up the imbalance between free-speech rights and 
copyright interests is misguided.  Probably the most compelling 
reason to consider fair use an inadequate free-speech 
accommodation is that it is an affirmative defense.  Again, this fact 
necessarily entails that anyone considering making questionable 
use of copyrighted material must first be sued for infringement and 
then endure a period of time-consuming and prohibitively 
expensive litigation before fair use can be of any avail, if at all.  
Furthermore, since fair use is not a “bright-line” rule and is decided 
only on a case-by-case basis,151 the success of a fair use defense is in 
many cases difficult to predict.  The threat of being sued, by itself, 
can have a profound chilling effect on a person’s speech.  Coupled 
with the difficulty of predicting a successful defense, the potentially 
high price of losing looms large and renders the chilling effect on 
 
 146. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546. 
 147. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. 
Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 651 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 148. However, the Court has come pretty close.  “From the infancy of 
copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has 
been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575-76 (quoting the U.S. 
Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 149. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236 (highlighting some of the categories enumerated 
in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 ed.). 
 150. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003). 
 151. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
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speech all the more potent.  This gives copyright holders a strong 
upper hand in compelling someone with an otherwise viable fair 
use claim to enter into a licensing agreement or to cease and desist 
altogether.152  Based on such realities, it is difficult to see how the 
fair use exception offers any real solace for an average garage band 
member or starving artist, who typically does not have the financial 
wherewithal to defend a copyright infringement claim. 
Another reason fair use is inadequate is that it fails to 
recognize the merits of certain forms of artistic expression and 
social commentary.  Although the Supreme Court ruled in Campbell 
that copying for the purposes of parody is a fair use, it allowed fair 
use protection only for works that aim their criticism at the original 
work from which the expression was taken.153  Works of ordinary 
satire, the Court held, comment on society in general, and hence 
fall outside the boundaries of fair use.154  This distinction makes 
things difficult for creators of satire who make use of copyrighted 
works in order to comment on social and cultural ills.  Jeff Koons, 
for example, is a well-known postmodern artist who found himself 
on the losing side of a number of copyright infringement suits just 
prior to the Campbell decision.155  Koons’s work appropriates images 
from various commercial media and “recontextualizes” them in a 
manner that levels criticism toward popular culture.  In each of 
these lawsuits, Koons’s fair use defense was unavailing because the 
critical elements of his works were not held to be primarily aimed 
at the originals from which they were taken, but rather at modern 
 
 152. Other commentators have explored the chilling effects of copyright 
regulation on speech as well.  See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating 
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).  See also Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on 
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 709 (1992); Jessica 
Litman, Electronic Commerce & Free Speech, 1 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 213, 217-218 
(1999), at http://www.msen.com/~litman/freespeech.pdf (last visited March 13, 
2004). 
 153. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81. 
 154. Id. at 581. 
 155. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (ruling Koons’s 
appropriation of Art Rogers “String of Puppies” photograph was not fair use); 
Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993) 
(finding Koons’s appropriation of Barbara Campbell’s “Boys with Pig” photograph 
not a fair use); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F.Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (holding Koons’s appropriation of “Odie” character from “Garfield” comic 
strip series not a fair use).  Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari only two years before, handing down its decision regarding 2 Live Crew’s 
parody in Campbell.  See Koons v. Rogers, 506 U.S. 934 (1992) (order denying 
certiorari). 
27
Denneson: The Definitional Imbalance between Copyright and the First Amendm
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
DENNESON-FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  10:14 PM 
922 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
society in general.156  The Supreme Court’s delineation of “true” 
parody from ordinary satire thus provides no vindication for artists 
like Koons and serves only to induce hesitation in anyone 
considering the use of another’s work for the purposes of social or 
artistic commentary. 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court justified its distinction 
between satire and parody on its view that “[p]arody needs to 
mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use 
the creation of its victim’s (or collectively victims’) imagination, 
whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires 
justification for the very act of borrowing.”157  This line of reasoning 
is based on the fears that a satirical work, which merely criticizes 
society at large, runs a greater risk of being sold or licensed out as a 
market substitute or derivative work because it is more likely to fail 
in “conjuring up” and differentiating itself from the original.158  In 
the Campbell Court’s view, a parody is said to conjure up the 
original work by altering it in a manner that lampoons the original 
directly, thereby creating a greater likelihood that consumers will 
not confuse it with the original work.159  A satire, on the other 
hand, need not be altered in order to serve a satiric purpose.160  
Hence, consumers are less likely to see the connection between a 
satirical work and the original, and might consequently mistake a 
satire for the original or a licensed derivative in the marketplace.161  
Furthermore, a satirist, unlike a parodist, is perfectly able to poke 
fun at society by creating her own original expression or by using 
works that are in the public domain.162 
This argument justifying the Court’s distinction between 
parody and satire is flawed, however, and it raises rather serious 
First Amendment concerns.  As Michael Einhorn points out, uses 
 
 156. See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310; Campbell, 1993 WL 97381 at *3; United Features 
Syndicate, 871 F.Supp. at 383-84. 
 157. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81. 
 158. See id. at 588. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. at 581. 
 161. See id. 
 162. William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, 
Presumption, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 714 (1993) (“If the 
defendant is commenting on something that has nothing to do with the plaintiff’s 
work, he has no need to use the plaintiff’s work to make that comment. He can 
equally well create his own expression, or use material in the public domain.”).  
Patry and Perlmutter’s article is cited approvingly in the Campbell decision.  See 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/5
DENNESON-FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  10:14 PM 
2004] COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 923 
for the purposes of social criticism fulfill First Amendment values at 
least as much, if not more than, direct criticism of a particular 
individual or work, and are just as likely to be refused licensing by 
the original copyright holder: 
From an economic perspective, a distinction in licensing 
procedures regarding parody and satire can be justified 
only if there is a market failure inherent in the licensing 
of one but not the other. The distinction between the two 
here can seem contrived. The comedic criticisms of satire 
and parody would seem equally transformative and 
usurping of demand for the original. Regarding the 
difficulty of obtaining a license, the chances for obtaining 
a purely voluntary license for disseminating either a 
parody or a number of satires—particularly involving 
political content or cultural criticism—may be equally 
slim.  As a general matter, it is also questionable to 
contend that satirists denied access to one work may 
always find a suitable substitute among others.  
The gains to the general public from satire, if anything, 
seem greater than in parody. There are profound benefits 
to be had when artists and writers can make use of 
recognized artifacts and icons to ridicule or criticize 
political institutions, cultural values, or media 
presentations.  From an economic perspective, these gains 
from social or political criticism are public benefits that 
cannot be appropriated in two-party exchange and cannot 
be readily priced.  To widen opportunities for political 
expression and facilitate cultural exchange, it would be 
beneficial to facilitate many of these satiric uses, which 
implicate critical dimensions that are no part of a directed 
parody.  It is difficult to understand how parodies that 
directly ridicule individual works would be of greater 
social importance.163 
In addition, the line between satire and parody is substantially 
blurred.  The Supreme Court even admits this much in Campbell, 
stating that “parody often shades into satire when society is 
lampooned through its creative artifacts . . . [and] a work may 
contain both parodic and nonparodic elements.”164  A gray area of 
this magnitude creates an intolerable degree of legal uncertainty.  
It exacerbates copyright’s chilling effect on speech by leaving 
 
 163. Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett’s License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and 
Markets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 603 (2002). 
 164. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581. 
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speakers—not to mention their attorneys—with little guidance as 
to whether a court will consider their work a satire or a parody.  
Such distinctions are hopelessly murky and wholly unnecessary.  
Judges should not have to call upon their artistic insights to 
categorize works into particular genres in order to make fair use 
determinations. 
If First Amendment values cannot overcome content owners’ 
financial concerns in order to protect social critics making use of 
copyrighted material, the ability of artists and social commentators 
to create relevant and effective satires of modern-day society will 
continue to diminish.  Today, as mentioned herein, the mass media 
dominates our culture, and most of the products of mass media are 
subject to copyright protection.165  Artists who wish to comment on 
society, therefore, find themselves faced with a dwindling “aesthetic 
vocabulary” of raw materials with which to work: 
With advancing technology . . . it has become both 
possible and profitable to saturate entire populations with 
images. As a result, privately owned images have become 
ubiquitous. In Sherrie Levine’s words, “ ‘[t]he world is 
 
 165. In addition to material subject to copyright protection, there are vast 
quantities of names, slogans, symbols, sounds, icons, and designs that are subject 
to trademark protection.  Trademark infringement and dilution litigation has 
been used against speakers in much the same manner as copyright infringement.  
The outcomes have varied by circuit.  See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. 
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d., 604 F.2d 200 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (upholding an injunction against the use of a promotional poster for 
the adult film “Debbie Does Dallas,” which featured porn actress Bambi Woods 
donning a cheerleading uniform that resembled those worn by the Dallas Cowboys 
cheerleaders); Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (finding trademark infringement where defendant sold caps and T-
shirts featuring a decayed Indian head and the slogans “Mutant of Omaha” and 
“Nuclear Holocaust Insurance” as a form of political protest of Mutual of Omaha’s 
involvement in nuclear proliferation); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci 
Publications et al., 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995) 
(holding that “Michelob Oily” parody of Anheuser-Busch logo in 1989 issue of 
Snicker magazine was infringing). But see L.L. Bean Inc. v. Drake Publishers Inc., 
811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987) (holding that High 
Society magazine’s erotic parody of L.L. Bean clothing catalogues, entitled “L.L. 
Beam’s Back-to-School-Sex-Catolog,” was not infringing); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. 
Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987) (ruling that defendant’s use of a 
pig’s head logo and “Lardasche” mark on jeans did not infringe upon Jordasche’s 
trademark); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998) (holding defendant entitled to summary judgment because his “Bally’s 
Sucks” web site did not infringe Bally’s mark).  For a recent, shining example of 
what an entirely meritless trademark infringement and dilution case looks like, see 
Fox News v. Penguin Group and Al Franken, as discussed in Fox Sues Al Franken, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at B1. 
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filled to suffocating. Man has placed his token on every 
stone. Every work, every image is leased and mortgaged.’ ” 
Thus, artists are deprived of their vocabulary, their source 
materials, and ultimately, the basic elements of their 
expression.166 
A biting satire exposing the folly of today’s hyper-
commercialized culture and vapid consumerism, for example, 
might not be especially poignant without at least some use of 
copyrighted materials.  Works in today’s public domain seem like 
fairly impotent substitutes for modern, copyrighted works because 
corporate copyrights now last ninety-five years from the date of 
publication or 120 years from the date of creation, whichever 
comes first, and individual copyrights last the life of the author plus 
seventy years.167  It is therefore laughable to suggest that materials 
created at the turn of the twentieth century can provide any satiric 
applicability to today’s society, or that materials copyrighted today 
will carry any significant satiric worth at the turn of the twenty-
second century.  Without First Amendment protection for 
transformative, satiric uses of copyrighted material, artists who 
attempt to hold a mirror up to society will be stuck with little more 
than anachronisms and irrelevancies. 
When an artist does hold a mirror up to society, reflecting 
back its images and icons in a critical light, the creators and owners 
of those images and icons are naturally going to be upset.  In these 
instances, use of the work is just as unlikely to be licensed as a use 
that lampoons the copyrighted work itself directly.  Excluding satire 
from fair use while protecting parody simply leaves the door wide 
open for copyright holders to engage in purely retaliatory, rent-
seeking litigation.  Returning to the case of Koons, for example, it 
is difficult to believe that the plaintiffs were actually concerned 
about their market for derivative works when they brought their 
lawsuits.  More likely, they felt insulted that Koons was singling 
their works out as part and parcel of the banality of popular 
culture.168  There can be little doubt that patrons of Koons’s work 
 
 166. See Schaumann, supra note 81, at 252 (internal citations omitted). 
 167. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(c) (2003).  Of course, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 112 Stat. 2827, has 
helped tremendously in exacerbating this state of affairs. 
 168. In all fairness, however, this was likely coupled with the fact that his works 
were selling for six figures.  All the same, neither of these facts should make a 
difference in the analysis when Koons’s works were not actually substituting for the 
originals in the marketplace. 
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shared in his disgust with the insipidity of modern popular culture 
and would not have had any interest in purchasing an approved 
sculpture either made or licensed by the plaintiffs.169  Likewise, fans 
of the plaintiffs’ works would not find Koons’s sculptures an 
acceptable substitute for or attractive derivative of the originals due 
to the derogatory light in which Koons cast them.  Therefore, it 
should go without saying that the plaintiffs would have flatly 
refused to license the use of their works to Koons, once alerted to 
his plans to incorporate them in a derisive art exhibit entitled, 
“Banality Show.”170  Koons is simply one of numerous authors who 
have been successfully sued because the copyright holders did not 
want their productions depicted in an unflattering light.171 
The First Amendment concerns here are obvious and the 
implications are grave.  The purpose of the Speech Clause is to 
prevent the government from tampering with an individual’s right 
to make her own choices regarding how she expresses her own 
unique values.  Allowing content owners to invoke the Copyright 
Act and the powers of the federal court system to suppress uses that 
 
 169. As Professor Niels Schaumann aptly puts it: 
Suppose the plaintiff in Rogers v. Koons claimed harm to the market 
that would have arisen had he decided to make his own sculptures 
based on his postcard. Does anyone suppose that the art world would 
have treated the plaintiff’s sculptures as equivalent to those of Koons? 
Certainly not; at least one feature making Koons’s work desirable is 
that it is by Koons. Even when the copying work is virtually identical to 
the copied work, the art market is well equipped to distinguish 
between them. In cases where the copying and copied works are not 
identical, distinguishing between the works is even easier (and is even 
less likely to damage copyright’s economic incentive to create). The art 
world is used to being faced with two works that appear identical; it 
does not treat such works as interchangeable. 
Schaumann, supra note 81, at 277-78. 
 170. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 171. Koons’s work is probably the most extreme form of copying.  However, 
copying which comes more within the gray area between satire and parody has 
routinely been ruled an unfair use.  See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting fair use for comic portrayal of Disney 
characters engaging in such anti-Disney activities as promiscuity and drug use), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997) (upholding an 
injunction of a satirical book about the O.J. Simpson trial written in Dr. Suess’s 
poetic style); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding 
injunction on “Cunnilingus Champion of Company C” musical spoof on “Boogie 
Woogie Bugle Boy”); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 
1397, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (male porn stars wearing Mickey Mouse ears in adult 
film while Mickey Mouse Club theme song played in the background held to be 
infringing). 
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are unflattering to their works rails against this most fundamental 
First Amendment liberty—especially when done under the pretext 
of protecting supposed potential markets for derivative works.  As 
Professor Baker explains: 
[C]ulturally challenging transformations . . . are precisely 
what the First Amendment most clearly should protect. 
(Properly interpreted, the Copyright Clause itself may not 
have authorized such legislative limitations on these uses.) 
The normative principle is that authors should have the 
right to contribute to, not exercise power over, cultural 
discourse and change . . . . 
[T]he First Amendment should especially protect 
dissident or norm-challenging uses of copyrighted 
materials. This consideration provides the constitutionally 
required reason for an expansive reading of the privilege 
to engage in transformative uses. The privilege should be 
read to prevent any stifling of diverse, especially dissenting 
or non-mainstream, expression. These uses are also 
precisely the ones for which many copyright holders, even 
for a payment, are least likely to give consent.  Thus, both 
the rationale for and the need for a privilege to ignore the 
author’s copyright claim exists here at a heightened 
level.172 
Although it might not necessarily aim its ridicule directly at the 
work being copied, ordinary satire can be substantially 
transformative in nature.  Koons’s work, for example, is 
transformative in the sense that it recasts the copyrighted works in 
an entirely new light, regardless of the fact that the original images 
are copied verbatim.  The images are presented in a manner that 
reveals them to be, in the eyes of both Koons and his admirers, 
expressions of an empty and vapid popular culture. 
Social commentary of Koons’s vein is easily distinguishable 
from the mindless manufacture of freeloading knock-offs.  For 
example, if an author wished to satirize some aspect of society and 
did so by copying another author’s satire that made a similar point, 
a clear case of copyright infringement would be afoot.  In this 
situation, the two authors would share a common audience, and 
thus a common market.  The copying author’s work would have no 
transformative value because it would shed no new, critical light on 
 
 172. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 
941-42 (2002). 
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the original.  Hence, the original author likely would be happy to 
negotiate a license for such a use because the resulting imitation 
would entail a form of flattery.  Works of social criticism such as 
Koons’s, by contrast, set their copied articles squarely within the 
universe of cultural folly held up to ridicule.  By placing such an 
unwarranted emphasis on a blurred differentiation between parody 
and satire, the Campbell Court overlooked the transformative 
possibilities existing in uses for social commentary.  Because the 
fair use defense, as currently applied, fails to protect certain 
transformative yet non-parodic uses, it is insufficient as a First 
Amendment accommodation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the “definitional balance,” a principle that 
courts continue to exhume every time a First Amendment 
contention is raised against the backdrop of a competing copyright 
interest, succeeds only in obscuring the increasingly unstable 
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment.  This 
article has set out to debunk the proposition that the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use provide a properly 
calibrated balance between First Amendment liberties and the 
goals of the Copyright Act.  In doing so, this article has shown that 
there are circumstances, uncontemplated under the definitional 
balance, in which courts should allow First Amendment values to 
overcome the economic interests of copyright holders. 
An author should not be allowed to use the weight of the 
copyright system as a means of retaliation or suppression.  First 
Amendment principles, if they mean anything, should be read to 
allow authors to use copyrighted works not only for certain news 
and press-related objectives as Nimmer suggests, but also for 
purposes of social criticism when there is little or no actual danger 
that the new work will usurp the original in the marketplace.  The 
touchstone for identifying such uses should lie not in 
differentiating parody from satire, but in determining whether the 
new work is transformative in the sense that it recasts the original in 
a critical or unapproving light, one whereby the copyright holder 
would likely be unwilling, at any price, to grant a license.  This 
would relieve judges of the need to enter the quagmire of parsing 
artistic genres while at the same time providing more legal 
predictability by removing judicial reliance on such hazy 
distinctions. 
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The best chance of facilitating such changes in the courts now 
probably rests with attempts to strengthen and expand the fair use 
doctrine.  Prior to the Eldred case, some commentators had 
suggested that copyright be subjected to heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny in cases dealing with free speech issues.173  
The petitioners in the Eldred case, however, argued the same,174 and 
the Court responded in no uncertain terms: “We reject Petitioner’s 
plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright 
scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and 
safeguards.”175  It now appears that any judicial entertainment of 
the use of heightened scrutiny is, at least for a while, out of the 
question.  Nevertheless, well-crafted fair use arguments stressing 
First Amendment values could provide possible inroads to 
increased judicial recognition of essential free speech liberties in 
the face of copyright infringement claims.176 
Copyright is intended to carry out the noble purpose of 
ensuring that authors are capable of making a living from the 
objects of their creativity.  It serves the indispensable function of 
helping to encourage the production of works of art, music, 
literature, film, and scholarship, all of which enrich our lives 
considerably.  Artists, writers, musicians, and other authors may 
understandably rejoice in various expansions of their rights under 
the copyright system, but they must also remain wary of the 
ramifications an expanded copyright regime can hold for their 
equally cherished freedom of speech.  Since most authors loathe 
censorship as much as infringement, they should take note of the 
fact that the copyright system itself can be used as an instrument of 
censorship.  When copyright laws can be invoked for the purpose 
of suppressing speech that offends a copyright holder, the 
objectives of both copyright and the First Amendment suffer. 
 
 173. See, e.g. Netanel, supra note 152, at 86 (“Heightened scrutiny should be 
applied both to discern whether Copyright Act provisions burden more speech 
than essential . . . .”). 
 174. Brief for Petitioners at 37-39, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002). 
 175. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003). 
 176. Legislative intervention to strengthen fair use under section 107 of the 
1976 Copyright Act or to create new forms of compulsory licensing is also an 
option, but given the current trend of catering to rent-seeking content owners in 
Congress, such intervention seems highly improbable. 
35
Denneson: The Definitional Imbalance between Copyright and the First Amendm
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
